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CASH SALES*
BY L. VOLD
The terms "cash sale" and "sale for cash," having equivalent
meanings, are if used loosely in the dealings of parties very am-
biguous on the question of whether the property is intended to
pass at once or is intended to pass only on payment of the price.
It is to be remembered that in an ordinary sale without any bar-
gain for credit being included the property passes but the seller
is entitled under his seller's lien to retain possession until the
price is paid.' "Terms cash" or equivalent expressions may
therefore frequently mean no more than that the seller thereby
gives notice that he does not waive his lien.2 The presumption
that the property was intended to pass at once may therefore
continue to be applicable although the parties have bargained
that payment should be in cash on delivery.
On the other hand, the parties may affirmatively agree that
the property is not to pass until the price is paid. Such agree-
ment by the parties, if actually made, is of course decisive to
show an intention contrary to the presumption that the property
passes at the time of the bargain, and makes payment of the
price rather than other circumstances the controlling element in
fixing the exact time of the passing of the property. If the bar-
gain is such that the property is to pass on the payment of the
* This article is a chapter from a forthcoming handbook on Sales now in
preparation.
'Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 54, codifying the common law on the point.
'A convenient illustration is Sanitary Carpet Cleaner Co. v. Reed Mfg.
Co., 145 N. Y. S. 218 (1913).
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price the transaction is a "cash sale," using that term in its
strictly limited technical sense. It is thus readily apparent that
the legal consequences of a bargain for a cash sale are very dif-
ferent from the legal consequences of an ordinary sale bargain.
In the ordinary sale bargain, if the goods are specific and the
parties are agreed on all the terms the property passes at once
to the buyer, neither delivery nor payment being necessary. 3
The seller in such cases has by operation of law a lien for the
price enabling him to hold possession, in the absence of a bar-
gain for credit, until the price is paid.4 In a cash sale, strictly
so called, on the other hand, the property by the understanding
of the parties remains in the seller until the price is paid., The
ordinary incidents of ownership are still with the seller. He
bears the risk of loss. 6 When he resumes possession he takes his
own goods, not the buyer's.7  The buyer acquires no property in
the goods until payment is made, does not owe the seller the pur-
chase price,8 and cannot be garnished for it by the seller's cred-
itors.9 In an ordinary sale the property passes at once but with
a seller's lien unless waived, while in a cash sale the property
does not pass till payment of the purchase price is made. A
technical cash sale, if established by the facts, thus readily
shows the necessary contrary intention to make inapplicable the
presumption that the property was intended to pass at once
without delivery or payment.
Many difficult problems are encountered, however, in connec-
tion with litigation over cash sales. These problems come not
'Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 19, rule 1, codifying the present-day common
law on the point.
' See footnote 1, above.
'Ocean S. S. Co. v. Southern States Naval Stores Co., 89 S. E. 838, 145
Ga. 798 (1916); Gate City Coffn Co. v. Hall, 125 S. E. 503, 33 Ga. A. 70
(1924); Chicago Iron & Metal Co. v. Berkson, 186 Ill. App. 194 (1914);
Loud v. Hanson, 164 P. 544, 53 Mont. 445 (1917); Blair v. Clark, 37 Pa.
Super. Ct. 44 (1917); Halff Co. v. Jones, 169 S. W. 906 (1914).
Hubbard v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 222 S. W. 886, 205 Mo. A. 316
(1920) ; Sharp v. Hawkins, 107 S. W. 1087, 129 Mo. App. 80 (1908).
" Hall v. Frick Co., 106 S. W. 1186, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 768 (1908).
'Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. 312 (1842).
'Hamra Bros. v. Herrell, 200 S. W. 776 (1918); Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H.
136 (1872). Nor can the buyer's creditors levy on the goods though they
happen to be found in the buyer's possession. Owens v. Jones-Kennedy Fur-
niture Co., 111 S. E. 86, 28 Ga. A. 317 (1922).
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so much from difficulty in determining the legal consequences of
cash sales as they come from the difficulty of determining on the
facts whether in the particular case the bargain was intended to
be an ordinary sale with lien in the seller or a technical cash sale.
In both, obviously, no delivery can be required of the seller until
payment. Here, as in other sales transactions, the parties are
likely to have framed the terms of their bargain with reference
to their practical business problems, without directly adverting
to the possible legal questions involved. Their intention on the
question of whether the property was to pass at once with a
seller's lien until payment, or whether it was not to pass at all
until payment may be but obscurely expressed or may be left to
inference from the expressed terms taken in connection with
their surrounding circumstances.
If the intention of the parties is clear that the property was
not to pass until payment the transaction of course is a cash
sale. Thus, where the parties have expressly stipulated by their
agreement that the property is to pass on payment of the pur-
chase price the transaction, in the absence of other qualifying
facts, is a cash sale.10 So, where the parties manifestly contem-
plate an immediate exchange of the goods for the price at the
time of the bargain with nothing left outstanding as an obliga-
tion on either side the transaction is intended to be a cash sale.
The clearest illustration of this is the common case of sale of
goods for cash over the counter in a retail shop." Another rea-
sonably clear illustration is the case where the seller in response
to orders for goods makes delivery directly to the buyer, there
being no arrangement for credit but the goods are to be paid for
in cash as delivered."2 On the other hand, the terms of the bar-
gain may make it clear that the sale is not a cash sale, strictly so
called. Thus, if credit is contracted for it is not a cash sale."1
Similarly, ordinary auction sales, even though announced as
" Wong Foo v. Southern Pac. Co., 181 P. 823, 41 Cal. A. 42 (1919) ; Engle-
hart v. Sage, 235 P. 767, 73 Mont. 139 (1925).
' Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136 (1872). In Professor Williston's classic
treatise on SALEs, sales made by shopkeepers over the counter furnish the
only class of cases that is treated as completely free from doubt. For an
extended discussion of cash sales, presenting the historical perspective, see
WILLISTON, SALES, Secs. 341-343.
' Bussey v. Barnett, 9 M. & W. 312 (1842).
"Menke v. First Nat. Bank, 206 S. W. 693 (1918).
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sales for cash, are not cash sales in the strictly technical sense,
but in the absence of other special conditions are sales passing
the property when the bid is accepted, the bargain for the spe-
cific articles being then complete, while the seller has a lien on
the goods for the price until payment.1 4
A common circumstance often raising possible doubts as to
whether the parties in any particular instance intended an ordi-
nary sale with lien or a technical cash sale is the fact that abso-
lute simultaneousness in the exchange of goods for money is fre-
quently as a practical matter impossible. The goods may be
bulky and heavy, as for instance in sales of coal or lumber, mak-
ing absolutely contemporaneous manual exchange of goods and
price out of the question. Similarly, the delay necessarily in-
volved for making inspection or verifying accounts, etc., may
make it inconvenient for the seller or his agent to wait for its
completion where he can in the interval attend to other matters
of importance and return after the lapse of a few minutes or a
few hours to get his purchase money. It must be remembered,
too, that the term "present time" is a relative term, which may
cover more than the infinitesimal moment forming the demarca-
tion point between the past and the future in the lapse of time.
It may for practical affairs often properly be regarded as cover-
ing a relatively short though consciously noticeable period of
time. In view of these considerations it is therefore regarded
as no obstacle to finding a transaction to be a technical cash sale
that delivery and payment are not carried out with absolute
contemporaneousness so long as the parties for the case in hand
manifestly have agreed to regard the exchange as simultane-
ous. 5 Where in such cases unforeseen events interrupt the
" Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 21; Forbes v. Hunter, 274 Ill. App. 400 (1921);
Russell v. Sammons, 217 Ill. App. 607 (1920); Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H.
394 (1882); Jawitz v. Reitman, 217 N. Y. S. 480 (1926).
There is some law contra. Thus, in Hand v. Matthews, 57 A. 351, 208
Pa. 149 (1904), it was held that, in the absence of a special agreement for
credit, a cash sale is presumed and the property does not pass, and that this
rule applies to auction sales. The Uniform Sales Act has, however, been
adopted in Pennsylvania since this case was decided.
Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 571 (1845) (boxes containing boots
and shoes); Burns Bros. v. Bigelow, 122 N. Y. S. 253 (1910) (coal); Rehr
v. Trumbull Lumber Co., 143 N. E. 558, 110 0. St. 208 (1924) (timbers);
Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 263 S. W. 87, 150 Tenn. 195 (1924)
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completion of the intended exchange and it becomes necessary to
distinguish between the delivery and the payment as the opera-
tive fact by the happening of which the parties intended the
property to pass it is understood, if the bargain was for a tech-
nical cash sale, that payment is the controlling element. In such
cases the seller does not part with his property nor the buyer be-
come the owner till payment is made, the parties expecting to ac-
company the payment with delivery, before, during, or after,
as closely as the practical circumstances of the particular case
will admit.'8 The application of this rule in the settlement of
controversies is, however, sometimes rendered confusing by the
loose use in sales contracts of the words "terms cash" or equiva-
lent expressions when in reality a short period of credit is con-
templated, and the buyer is free at once without limitation, just
like any other owner, to use or dispose of the goods as he pleases.
Obviously in such cases the facts when correctly analyzed show
that the property was intended to pass at once, and that the sell-
er has extended a short credit for the price.17  Some cases, how-
(cotton); Allen Lumber Co. v. Higuera, 85 A. 979, 86 Vt. 453 (1913) (lum-
ber) ; Luce v. Brown, 118 A. 530, 96 Vt. 140 (1922) (horse trade).
" The seller of a bond has been held not to have waived payment as a con-
dition to the passing of title, where his messenger delivered the bond to a
broker and another messenger, according to the usual business custom, call-
ed to receive payment a few hours later, after allowing time for the making
of comparisons and book entries and the drawing of checks. In re Perpall,
256 F. 758 (1919). So under the custom of trade at the grain exchanges
the transaction is regarded as a cash sale though it may take till the fol-
lowing day or even longer to complete the processes of weighing, grading,
delivery, and payment. Dalrymple v. Randall, Gee & Mitchell Co., 174
N. W. 520, 144 Minn. 27 (1919); Wright v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.,
129 S. W. 407, 144 Mo. App. 640 (1910).
Sometimes this conception is sought to be carried to absurd extremes.
Thus in Groves v. Warren, 123 N. E. 659, 226 N. Y. 459 (1919), the seller
claimed a delay of several months during which goods were under the agree-
ment sold off by buyer and money turned over to seller did not prevent the
transactions being a cash sale. The seller's view prevailed in the lower
court but was reversed on appeal. So in Island Trading Co. v. Berg Bros.
Inc., 146 N. E. 345, 239 N. Y. 229 (1924), the seller on the buyer's order
shipped goods to a third party who was a customer of the buyer who paid
the buyer for the goods. The seller waited several weeks for the buyer to
pay. Finding the buyer who had ordered the goods thus shipped failed to
pay, he stopped the goods in transit, claiming the transaction was intended
as a cash sale. The court, however, held him liable for conversion.
1 "Sale of goods to be paid for in ten or thirty days, is not in fact a cash
transaction, and cannot by agreement of the parties, or a usage of mer-
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ever, have disregarded these manifest facts and in charmed
deference to the magical words "terms cash" have held even such
transactions to be cash sales. 18
The problem presented by the frequent practical impossibility
of making an absolutely simultaneous exchange of the goods for
the price shades off by degrees into a related problem of whether
in the actual case in controversy there has been a waiver of the
cash requirement and a short though indefinite period of credit
accepted in its place. In many cases where delivery is made in
the expectation of immediate payment but payment does not im-
mediately follow, as for instance where the buyer cannot at the
moment be found, or when asked to pay he makes excuses and
promises to get the money at once but fails to do so, it may be-
come a very close question on the facts whether or not the seller
has acquiesced in the delay and permitted the buyer to use the
goods as his own on his promise to pay, thus in fact extending
credit. Since the delivery was conditioned on receiving imme-
diate payment on which the property was to pass, if such pay-
ment is not forthcoming the seller is entitled at once to resume
possession of his goods,'19 and this right is not affected by the fact
that in the brief delay that has occurred the goods have been sold
chants, be regarded as such within the meaning of the Bankrupt Law." In
re Morrow, 134 F. 686 (1901).
Another illustration may be drawn from Maley-Thompson & Moffett Co.
v. Thomas Forman Co., 146 N. W. 95, 179 Mich. 548 (1914), where lumber
was shipped, the statement rendered ending: "Settlement in 10 days by
cash less 2% of 60 day acceptance." There was also subsequent delay. It
was held that the property had passed.
McCall v. Hunter, Pearce & Batty, 70 S. E. 59, 8 Ga. App. 612 (1911);
Strother v. McMullen Lumber Co., 98 S. W. 34 (1906), 200 Mo. 647; Stone
v. Perry, 60 Me. 48 (1872).
Anundson v. Standard Printing & Mfg. Co., 118 N. W. 789, 140 Iowa
464 (1908); Taylor v. Applebaum, 118 N. W. 492, 154 Mich. 682 (1908);
Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 571 (1845); Allen Lumber Co. v. Higuera,
85 A. 979, 86 Vt. 453 (1913).
Careful analysis of the legal relations involved undoubtedly indicates that
the original delivery in such cases is merely a handing over of the goods to
the buyer's custody, the seller being still in possession and the seller's intent
to control still persisting till getting his contemporaneous payment. Such
cases shade off gradually into cases where the possession is given the buyer
conditioned on his paying cash at once. It does not seem necessary to go
into this feature of the question in ordinary cash sale cases, though the dis-
tinction might become important on the question of larceny.
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to some third party by the defaulting buyer.20  If agreement or
usage shows that credit was in fact extended the condition re-
quiring cash payment is waived. 21 While delivery without se-
curing payment is if nothing is said about it presumptive evi-
dence of a waiver such evidence is not conclusive. 22 If the seller
permits the buyer to retain the goods for a considerable time
without objection that delay is conclusive evidence of a waiver.23
While the cases are not entirely in accord as to the effect of delay
where the seller protests but does nothing4 the rule that seems
best supported in reason is that failure promptly to reclaim pos-
session constitutes a waiver of the cash payment.25 Manifestly
failure promptly to reclaim possession under such circumstances
indicates either that the seller assents to the buyer's continuing
in possession without the title's passing or that he assents to the
buyer's becoming owner, trusting him to pay. If the latter, it
is an ordinary sale, with property passing to the buyer but pay-
ment postponed. If the former, it is an arrangement in every
aspect like a conditional sale, the buyer having the beneficial use
and enjoyment but title reserved in the seller as security. In
either view of such facts, therefore, such cases of prolonged de-
lay in payment after the delivery of possession are incompatible
with the cash sale arrangement which contemplates an immediate
People v. Mills Sing, 183 P. 865 (1919) ; Maxherman Co. v. Alper, 206
N. Y. S. 233 (1924); Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., (1924), 150
Tenn. 195, 263 S. W. 87.
"Ruediger v. Dennis, 201 S. W. 943, 199 Mo. App. 102 (1918) ; Baltimore
& 0. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Good, 92 N. E. 435, 82 Ohio St. 278, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.)
713 (1910).
'Merrill Furniture Co. v. Hill, 32 A. 712, 87 Me. 17 (1894); Ballard v.
First Nat. Bank of Bolivar, 195 S. W. 559 (1917).
'In re O'Callaghan, 225 F. 133 (1914) (three weeks); Oldridge v. Sut-
ton, 137 S. W. 994, 157 Mo. App. 485 (1911) (two weeks); Hirsch Lumber
Co. v. Hubbell, 128 N. Y. S. 85, 143 App. Div. 317 (1911) (five weeks);
King v. Adams, 265 F. 9 (1920) (under payment caused by mistake in
weights) ; H. K. Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 F. 305, 96 C. C. A. 197 (1909) (five
months).
" Some cases apparently hold that in the absence of estoppel mere delay
in securing payment does not constitute a waiver where the delivery in fact
was made in expectation of immediate payment. Graham v. John Flannery
Co., 124 S. E. 729, 32 Ga. A. 713 (1924) ; Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co.
v. Lammert Furniture Co., 166 S. W. 1079, 182 Mo. App. 549 (1914).
" Frech v. Lewis, 67 A. 45, 218 Pa. 141 (1907); Lehman v. People's Fur-
niture Co., 142 P. 986, 42 Okl. 761, L. R. A. 1915D 355 (1914).
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exchange of the goods for the price before the buyer is to acquire
any interest in the goods.28
A special application of the problem of waiver is frequently
presented in cases where the bargain contemplates a cash sale
and the buyer pays not by legal tender currency but by his per-
sonal check. Payment by check is without special agreement
commonly regarded as only conditional payment until cashed.2
Following this analysis it is held by the great weight of Ameri-
can authority that delivering the goods to the buyer and taking
his check for the price is not a waiver of the condition of pay-
ment in cash but that the property passes when the check is
cashed. If, then, the check is dishonored on presentation, as for
instance where it was forged or where the drawer had no funds,
it is held that the goods still belong to the seller 21 unless the sell-
er is shown to have accepted the check in absolute payment,20
and that he can recover them from subsequent purchasers 3o from
the buyer even when they are purchasers in good faith for value
E. I. Dupont Co. v. John Shields Construction Co., 162 F. 198; Black-
shear v. Burke, 74 Ala. 239; Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton Mills, 111 Mass.
446.
' This view manifestly is adopted from the law of negotiable paper where
it is held by the great weight of authority that the giving of a note does not
prevent the creditor's having recourse to the original obligation if the note
is dishonored at maturity instead of merely suing on the note. Obviously,
in note cases, credit has been extended.
' South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobson, 190 P. 628
(1920) ; John N. Sims & Sons v. Bolton, 74 S. E. 770, 138 Ga. 73 (1912) ;
Everroad v. Dickson Planing Mill Co., 106 S. E. 193, 26 Ga. A. 329 (1921) ;
Moore v. Walker, 108 S. E. 809, 27 Ga. A. 428 (1921); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Anderson, 180 N. W. 273 (1920); Lewis v. James McMahon
& Co., 271 S. W. 779, 307 Mo. 552 (1925) ; Thomas v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of
Ludlow, 217 S. W. 860 (1920) ; Crocker State Bank v. White, 226 S. W. 972
(1920) ; Maxwell v. Dunham, 297 S. W. 94 (1927) ; First Nat. Bank v. Grif-
fin & Griffin, 120 P. 595, 31 Old. 382, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020 (1911) ; C. M.
Keys Coummission Co. v. Beatty, 142 P. 1102, 42 Okl. 721 (1914); Gose v.
Brooks, 229 S. W. 979 (1921); Quality Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber
& Shingle Co., 187 P. 705, 110 Wash. 60 (1920).
Under certain special statutes this position has been upheld even though
the facts may indicate assent to a temporary delay in payment. See Harde-
man v. Reynolds, 101 S. E. 804, 149 Ga. 660 (1920) ; Skinner v. Hillis, 104
S. E. 508 (1920) ; Morris & Co. v. Walker Bros. Co., 116 S. E. 201 (1923);
Graham v. John Flannery Co., 124 S. E. 729 (1924).
Cox Hat Co. v. Adams, 70 So. 203, 14 Ala. App. 426 (1915) ; Eaton v.
State, 78 So. 321 (1918); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Hartman, 129
S. W. 179 (1910) ; Goodwin v. Bear, 209 P. 1080, 122 Wash. 49 (1922).
Mott v. Nelson, 220 P. 617, 96 Ok. 117 (1923).
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without notice.31 The course of reasoning to sustain this result
is that as the buyer never acquired the property, the transaction
having been a cash sale and there never having been payment,
subpurchasers from him can get nothing. While this reasoning
seems superficially plausible closer analysis readily reveals seri-
ous doubts as to its logical correctness. Is payment by check in
such cases conditional in any different sense than in cases of pay-
ment by note where manifestly credit is extended and the prop-
erty passes ?8  As a matter of fact is there not assent in check
cases to the buyer's dealing with the goods as owner before the
check is finally collected? Failure to recognize this leads to
great hardship on innocent purchasers from the defaulting buy-
er. 3 On the other hand, the contrary view would lead to great
hardship on original sellers in cash transactions, and might have
wider unfortunate social consequences more than outweighing
any general benefit to be derived from the resulting increased
negotiability of goods.34  It therefore seems very unlikely that
logical strictures upon the rule generally prevailing in this coun-
try will bring about any change in the law on the matter.
Where the bargain is for specific goods and the parties are
agreed on all the terms but there is serious doubt as to whether
the parties intended an ordinary sale with the property passing
" Barksdale v. Banks, 90 So. 913 (1921) ; Johnson v. Iankovitz, 57 Or. 28,
102 P. 799, 110 P. 398 (1910); Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 268 S. W.
125, 152 Tenn. 15 (1924), rehearing denied 268 S. W. 1120 (1924); John S.
Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 290 S. W. 994, 154 Tenn. 689 (1927).
Krummenacher Drug Co. v. Chouteau, 296 S. W. 255 (1927) ; Durham
v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of the City of New York, 182 N. Y. S. 887 (1920);
Klingstein v. Vaughan, 140 S. E. 275 (1927).
' For elaborate argument on this point criticizing the position taken by
the great weight of American authority see WILLISTON, SALES (2nd ed.)
Sec. 346a.
"In Young v. Harris-Cortuer Co., 268 S. W. 125 (1924), at p. 127, the
court, by McKinney J. said: "We feel safe in saying that, as a matter of
custom and convenience, most of the cash transactions of the country are
paid with checks. A farmer brings in his cotton, tobacco, or wheat to town
for sale and sells same, and, as a general rule, is paid by check, although
all of such sales are treated as cash transactions. If, in such a case, the
purchasers can immediately resell to an innocent party and convey good
title, it would follow that vendors would refuse to accept checks and would
require the actual money, which would result in great inconvenience and risk
to merchants engaged in buying such produce, since it would require them to
keep on hand large sums of actual cash. This would result in revolutioniz-
ing the custom of merchants in such matters."
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at once or whether they intended a cash sale with the property
not to pass till payment, it is submitted that the transaction
should be held to be an ordinary sale rather than a technical
cash sale. The goods being specific and the parties agreed on all
the terms, the case falls directly within the presumption that un-
less a contrary intent appears the property was intended to pass
at once.35 In other words, unless the intent to make it a tech-
nical cash sale can be affirmatively made out, the case falls with-
in the ordinary rule that the property passes at once and neither
delivery nor payment is necessary. As discussed elsewhere, how-
ever, the rule in the early law was the other way,30 and many
courts unless carefully cautioned in this respect still readily re-
peat the old phrase that sales in which no time is agreed upon
for payment are prima facie cash sales. Sometimes such state-
ments still seem to form the substantial basis for decision of con-
troversies. 37 Very frequently, however, in cases where such
language appears in the opinions examination of the facts re-
veals that the actual result can be sustained on other grounds.38
Prominent among these is the fact that the seller often had a lien
and therefore in any event was entitled to hold possession until
payment, 39 and delivery in expectation of immediate payment
could therefore in any event properly be held to be a merely con-
ditional delivery.
'See Sales Act, Sec. 19, rule 1. For a good judicial exposition of this
view see In re Liebig, 255 F. 458 (1918).
" See WILLISTON, SALES, See. 342.
Sharp v. Hawkins, 107 S. W. 1087, 129 Mo. App. 80 (1908); Luce v.
Brown, 118 A. 530, 96 Vt. 140 (1922). Statutes may even accentuate this po-
sition. See the Civil Code of Georgia (1910), sec. 4126, which has been fre-
quently litigated. See for instance Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. W. W.
Gordon & Co., 73 S. E. 594, 10 Ga. App. 311 (1912).
' Hart-Wood Lumber Co. v. Bonaly, 219 P. 432, 192 Cal. 180 (1923);
Puritas Coffee & Tea Co. v. De Matini, 206 P. 96, 56 Cal. A. 628 (1922);
Lumley v. Miller, 119 N. W. 1014, 23 S. D. 16 (1909); Ewing v. Musser, 42
Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (1910).
'Hudson & Thompson v. Barrett, 77 So. 428 (1917) ; Canadian Northern
Ry. Co. v. Northern Mississippi Ry Co., 209 F. 758, 126 C. C. A. 482 (1913) ;
Wong Foo v. Southern Pac. Co., 181 P. 823, 41 Cal. A. 42 (1919) ; Broughton
v. Hunter's Bank, 264 S. W. 469 (1924); Davidson v. Diamond Furniture
Co., 97 S. E. 480, 176 N. C. 569 (1918).
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